Books

Growth 365

Tomas Laurinavicius

ChaptersWin The Hard Side First

Win The Hard Side First

Every two-sided network has one scarce, high-value side, concentrate the budget there and the easy side follows.

Every two-sided product has a side that just shows up and a side you have to fight for. Riders showed up for Uber on their own. Drivers had to be recruited, trained, and paid to stick around. Men showed up for Tinder without being asked twice. Women had to be convinced the app was not another creepy hookup tool. Most founders spend their first growth dollar on the side that is easiest to sign up, because the number moves fast and it feels like traction. That is backwards. The easy side only exists because the hard side is already there.

What to do: Map both sides of your network and name which one is genuinely scarce, the side the other side cannot function without and that costs real effort, money, or trust to bring on. Send your first acquisition budget, your best support and onboarding attention, and any manual "things that don't scale" hustle there before you spend a cent chasing the easy side.

Why it works: The easy side only sticks around for what the hard side provides, so growing the hard side is what actually grows the network. Growing the easy side alone just gives you more people staring at an empty marketplace.

Example: Uber found that in any given city, the top 20% of its drivers generated 60% of all trips. Early growth spend went into recruiting and holding onto that thin slice of power drivers, not into rider acquisition (documented in Andrew Chen's The Cold Start Problem).

Walk it through

Here is the sequence, using how Uber and Tinder actually ran it.

1. Draw both sides and ask which one collapses the product if it disappears for a week. Take away Uber's riders for a week and drivers grumble about slow days. Take away Uber's drivers for a week and the app has nothing to sell. Drivers were the hard side. Take away Tinder's men for a week and women barely notice. Take away Tinder's women and the app is worthless to everyone left. Women were the hard side.

2. Find the concentration inside the hard side itself. It is rarely spread evenly. Uber's own numbers showed a fifth of drivers in a market driving three fifths of the trips. Those power drivers are who you protect and court, not the median driver, and definitely not the rider.

3. Spend the first dollar where the constraint actually is. Tinder's founders did not run ads. They got invited into a party at a USC sorority, made downloading Tinder the price of entry, and walked out with roughly 500 of exactly the users men wanted to meet. That seed cohort reportedly used the app 95% daily, for around three hours a day. That is what happens when you seed the scarce side with real intent instead of the average sign-up.

4. Let the easy side arrive on its own. Once Tinder had a dense, attractive pool of women on one campus, men downloaded the app without anyone chasing them. Once Uber had drivers reliably online in a city, riders came because the promise, a car in minutes, actually held up.

The read

  • The hard side is whichever side the other cannot do without. Ask what breaks first if a side disappears for a week. That answer, not sign-up volume, tells you where to spend.
  • The hard side has its own 80/20 inside it. Uber's power drivers prove the scarce side is not one flat group either. A small slice of it does most of the work, and that slice is who you actually need to keep.
  • Sequencing beats balance. Nobody grew both sides evenly at once. Uber and Tinder both went all in on one side first and let the second side follow, because splitting a limited budget across a problem you have not solved yet just slows everything down.

Steal it

Run this before you build another two-sided feature, not after. List both sides of your network, and for each one ask what it costs to acquire and what happens if it vanishes for a week. Whichever side is expensive to get and catastrophic to lose is your hard side, full stop, even if it is the smaller group of the two. Put your onboarding calls, your incentive budget, and your product roadmap there first. Everything else, including the two-sided marketplace feature you were excited to ship, waits until that side is dense enough to make the easy side's decision easy.

Defend it the same way you built it. If you supply anything scarce into someone else's marketplace, you are the hard side there, and every incentive that platform offers you is leverage, not gratitude. The moment demand no longer depends on any one supplier, the terms quietly change. Ask any Uber driver who was recruited with a guarantee that later disappeared.

Gotchas

  • Concentration spend looks like a loss on paper. Pouring money into a small slice of scarce users tanks your blended CAC and your total sign-up count for a while. Measure trips or transactions per hard-side user, not headcount, or you will talk yourself out of the strategy before it has time to work.
  • The hard side shifts as a market matures. Drivers were scarce for Uber in a new city. In a saturated one, retaining loyal riders against a cheaper competitor can become the harder problem. Re-run the "what breaks in a week" test per market, not once for the whole company.
  • Do not manufacture scarcity to fake this. Artificially gating the easy side to look like you have solved cold start is a different move entirely, and real users can tell the difference between genuine density and an empty room with a velvet rope.